Attribution of Responsibility in Paranoid and Nonparanoid Schizophrenics by Payne, Mary Ruth Marsh
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1975 
Attribution of Responsibility in Paranoid and Nonparanoid 
Schizophrenics 
Mary Ruth Marsh Payne 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Payne, Mary Ruth Marsh, "Attribution of Responsibility in Paranoid and Nonparanoid Schizophrenics" 
(1975). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539624919. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-wddy-r166 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN 
PARANOID AND NONPARANOID SCHIZOPHRENICS
A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of Psychology 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
by
Mary Ruth Marsh Payne 
1975
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts
/Heouu /HtUiA
I Mary Ruth Marsh Payne Q
Approved April 30, 1975
1 ? ~ i L  . t *
Richard M. Bloch, Ph.D.
Virgil/y„ McKenna, Ph.D
Kelly G. Shaver, Ph.D.
Glenn D. Shean. Ph.D.
uJLU<
Stanley B .^Williams, Chairman 
Department of Psychology
Table of Contents
Page
Acknowledgments......................   . . iv
List of Tables . . . . . . .  ......... . . . . . .  ......... v
List of Figures ........................ . . . . . . . . . . .  vl
A b s t r a c t ............................................. .. vii
Introduction.......................... .......................  2
Experiment I ................................ ................. 13
Method . . . . .  • . • • • • . . •  ............. 13
Results......................................... ..........  15
Discussion  .......................    17
Experiment I I . .............................................   18
M e t h o d ............................................. .. 18
Results....................................................  28
D i s c u s s i o n ............................... ................ 35
Appendix  ...................    41
A. Ullmann-Giovannoni Scale ...................   42
B. Attribution of Responsibility Questionnaire .......... 44
C. Attribution Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51
D. Instructions .................  . . . . . . . . . . .  54
References ...................  . . . . . . . . .    62
iii
623980
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The writer wishes to express her appreciation to Professor 
Kelly Shaver for his guidance and support, and for the regard he has 
shown for her and this investigation throughout the last year. Thanks 
are due also to Professors Glenn Shean, Virgil McKenna, and Richard 
Bloch for their assistance and advice, to Professor Cynthia Null for 
her statistical aid, and to Daryl Ramsey, Anne Sullivan, James 
Bullock, and Chris Faia for their expert technical assistance. The 
writer is indebted, in particular, to Philip Payne for his inspira­
tion and his understanding, and to Edith Marsh and Alan and Holly 
Shaw for their continual support. Sincere appreciation is expressed . 
to the residents and staff members of Eastern State Hospital, whose 
kindness and cooperation made possible this investigation.
iv
List of Tables
Table Page
1. Mean efficiency scores for the Stroop tasks . . . .  29
2. Mean attributions of responsibility ............ . 31
3. Mean efficiency scores for the Stroop tasks
(nonparanoid subjects) . ............................ 34
v
List of Figures
Figure
1.
Page
Mean number of attributions of responsibility
made to Heider's five attributional levels.......... 16
vi
ABSTRACT
Two experiments were conducted to investigate attributions 
of responsibility made by institutionalized patients. Using Shaw 
and Sulzer’s (1964) Attribution of Responsibility Questionnaire, 
Experiment I measured the sophistication of 13 paranoid and 15 
nonparanoid schizophrenics in making attributions of responsibility. 
Paranoids made more sophisticated attributions than did nonparanoids, 
and their attributional pattern across Heider*s (1950) five levels 
corresponded to the attributions made by normals in other studies.
Experiment II combined elements of defensive attribution 
theory (Shaver, 1970) and the theory of aversive maternal control 
(Heilbrun, 1973) to account for attributions of responsibility made 
by patients. The performance of 15 paranoid and.15 nonparanoid 
schizophrenics was measured on a Stroop (1935) test before and after 
the tape, to twelve incidents in which the main person was either 
similar to or different from the subjects. Results show defensive 
attribution in paranoids and nonparanoids but not under the same 
conditions that produce them in normals.
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ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN . 
PARANOID AND NONPARANOID SCHIZOPHRENICS
Introduction
Attribution theory deals with the rules that people use 
in trying to determine the causes and meaning of observed be­
havior (Jones, Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett,, Valins, and Weiner, 1972; 
Shaver, 1975). The search for meaning will be affected by the 
assumptions, the expectations, and the personal needs the attribu- 
tor brings to his task, because these shape the attribution pro­
cess by filling in gaps in information, relating behavioral informa­
tion to comparative standards, and producing shifts in attention or 
emphasis (Jones, et.al., 1972). Since attributions are based on 
more than just the behavioral information available, people 
frequently draw incorrect inferences about the causes of social 
events and may then behave in accordance with these inferences.
An extreme example of incorrect inference is found in 
paranoid schizophrenics, whose most characteristic defense mechanism 
is projection (Shapiro, 1965). The projection typical of paranoia 
can be described as the misattribution of one's own objectionable 
motives, affects, or ideas to an external object, person, or group. 
According to Cameron (1959), when a paranoid is unable to repress 
successfully the fantasies, conflicts, and feelings of inadequacy 
he cannot bear to acknowledge in himself, he projects them so that 
they appear to be coming from outside himself. Ideas of persecution 
may predominate so that he may become a furtive, constricted,
2
3apprehensively suspicious person; or he may develop delusions of 
grandeur and become a self-important and arrogant individual 
(Coleman, 1972). Projection permits him to think that he is the 
victim of a hostile environment rather than the victim of defects 
in himself. He is not to blame, the environment is to blame.
Sullivan (1956) maintains that the paranoid dynamism is 
rooted in an awareness of inferiority which necessitates a trans­
fer or externalization of blame. The essence of the paranoid!s 
dynamics is this transference of blame, which functions to protect 
his vulnerable feelings of self-worth. The psychotic paranoid also 
misinterprets social events in order to construct an explanation 
for his harsh treatment by the environment. Because of this, the 
paranoid schizophrenic suffers a serious impairment of certain 
classes of reality experience: He disdains the obvious as misleading,
superficial, and something to be seen through (Shapiro, 1965). He 
attends to a situation or communication not to determine what it is 
but to understand what it signifies as a potential threat to him­
self. He looks for clues to threat, and constructs a subjective 
world from them while disregarding the context in which they appear. 
His clues are tied to suspicious biases or suppositions that support 
his delusional system. Cameron (1959) has referred to this process 
as the building up of a paranoid "pseudo-community in which .the 
individual organizes the people around him, real or imagined, into 
a structured group whose purpose it is to carry out some action 
against him. Everything important to him comes to be interpreted
in terras of this delusional system. As a result, he fails to under­
stand the motives and point of view of others, he does not often 
reality test, and when he is in stressful situations he is not able 
to suspend judgment until he can verify his interpretations. Thus 
he often misinterprets what happens in his world. It is clear that 
paranoid schizophrenics potentially contaminate many of the attribu­
tions they use to explain the behavior they observe in themselves 
and others.
Of particular interest in the present research is the way 
in which paranoids attribute the responsibility for some aspects of 
their experience. It is well documented that when paranoids make 
attributions of responsibility to themselves, to people who are 
responding to them in social situations, or to persons who are part 
of their delusional system they do so in a defensive style (Angyal, 
1965; Shapiro, 1965). But the question may be asked, how do paranoids 
account for and explain the behavior of other people whose behavior 
is independent of the paranoid? The intent of the present study was 
to compare two different sorts of responsibility attributions made 
by paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics in an attempt to answer 
this question.
One way of looking at attribution is in terms of its level 
of sophistication or development (Sulzer, 1971). Heider (1958) 
delineates five levels in which attributions of responsibility to 
the person vary as the relative contributions of person and 
environment change. These levels represent a progression from
relatively primitive to relatively sophisticated cognitive processes, 
and are intended to be developmental stages (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1973). 
The levels have been labeled! and restated, first by Shaw and Sulzer 
(1964), and later by Sulzer (1971) as follows:
Level I: Association: The person is held responsible for
any outcome that he is connected with in any way. Thus, 
a person may be blamed for harmful acts committed by his 
friends or when he is merely standing nearby \hen one 
stumbles and falls.
Level II; Causality: The person is held responsible for
any effect that he produced by his actions, even though 
he definitely could not have foreseen the consequences of 
his actions. As in Piaget’s (1932) "objective responsi­
bility" the person is judged according to what he does,
e
but not according to his motives.
Level III: Foreseeability: The person is held responsible
for any foreseeable effect that he produced by his actions 
even though the effect was not a part of his goals or 
intentions. He is held responsible for the lack of 
restraint that a wider cognitive field would have 
produced.
Level IV: :Intentionality: The person is held responsible
for any effect that he produced by his actions, fore­
seeing the.outcome and intending to produce the effects. 
This corresponds roughly to Piaget’s "subjective
responsibility" in which motives are the central issue.
Level V: Justifiability: The person is held only partly
responsible for any effect that he intentionally produced 
if the circumstances were such that most persons would 
have felt and acted as he did. Responsibility for the 
act is at least shared by the coercive environment.
Attribution of personal responsibility by normal adults has 
been found to increase up to a maximum at Level IV, where cues 
clearly indicate intention, and then decrease at Level V, where the 
actor’s behavior is attributed to the environment because of exten­
uating circumstances. For the most unsophisticated individual, the 
minimal information contained in Level I should be a sufficient basis 
for attributions, and the information contained in the "higher" 
levels would have the effect of unnecessary redundancy (Sulzer, 1971).
Level of attributional sophistication has not previously 
been assessed in institutionalized patients, but there is good 
reason to believe that the nature of premorbid development might 
have some effect on attributional responses. The distinction between 
"process" and "reactive" premorbid development is based on the 
establishment of competence in.the social-sexual sphere during the 
period extending from adolescence through young adulthood (Heilbrun, 
1973). It has been found that process schizophrenics are clearly 
less adequate in their premorbid development than reactive schizo­
phrenics. Further, reactive schizophrenics are broader or more 
effective in their use of external information than are process
7schizophrenics, who are less responsive to external stimulation. 
Heilbrun (1973) concludes that a commonality exists between the be­
haviors associated with reactive and paranoid, and between process 
and nonparanoid status. Thus,, for a number of reasons, we might 
expect paranoids, reactive type, to make attributions of responsibility 
in a more sophisticated way than nonparanoids, process type, who are 
more developmentally inhibited.
The second comparison to be made in this research deals 
with the way in which arousal affects the attributions of responsi­
bility made by paranoids and nonparanoids. It has been shown that 
certain kinds of arousal affect the attributions of responsibility 
made by normal persons in fairly consistent ways. When people know 
that it is situationally possible for them to be perpetrators of a 
negative outcome they attribute responsibility in a way that denies 
personal similarity and distinguishes themselves from the perpetrator. 
They are more harsh in.their attribution of responsibility, as if to 
say, "I wouldnft act that way in the same situation” (Shaver, 1970). 
Further, if the level of threat is increased by making the perpetrators 
highly similar to themselves, people are more lenient with those 
perpetrators who are similar (Chaikin and Darley, 1973; Shaver, 1970; 
Sorrentino and Boutilier, 1974). They tend to attribute more 
responsibility to environmental factors. Thus, situational possibility 
and personal similarity are variables which lead normal persons to 
make defensive attributions of responsibility (Shaver, 1970; Shaver, 
1973). It is possible that paranoids and nonparanoids also make
defensive attributions.when they are personally or environmentally 
similar to perpetrators, but it is also possible that these condi­
tions do not arouse feelings of threat in patients while other con­
ditions relevant to morbidity might do so.
In.trying to anticipate what factors will stimulate a de­
fensive reaction in paranoid schizophrenics, we should take into 
account the unique personal needs which may affect their attribu­
tions of responsibility. Research into the need systems of various 
clinical groups has shown that paranoids differ from normals most 
in their high needs for aggression, defendence, and blame avoidance 
(Chambers, 1975). According*to these findings, paranoids do not 
differentiate aggression from blame avoidance. Rather, expressions 
of aggression arouse guilt and fear of blame instead of feelings 
of assertion. This occurs especially when blame results in the 
possibility of retaliation or punishment. This is reflected in the 
tendency of many paranoids to construct delusional systems around 
impersonal, vague, or abstract entities, such as laser beams or the 
FBI. Because.blame avoidance and the projection of blame are 
important dynamic features in paranoid schizophrenia, it is impor­
tant to make a clear distinction between two aspects of responsi­
bility: Causality for events,,and moral accountability or blame­
worthiness for those events.
Moral accountability does not necessarily follow from 
judgments of personal causality (Shaver, 1975). They are ambiguously 
related concepts. Causality is best represented by local causality,
9where the stimulus person actually produces the effect alone or with 
others, and low foreseeability, which avoids the complications of 
foreknowledge and thus intentionality to produce the consequences of 
the action. Therefore, causality is relatively free of distortion 
based on consequence effects (Shaver, 1975). Moral accountability, 
however, is a value judgment made by the perceiver that may or may 
not be consistent with the behavioral evidence. Judgments of moral 
accountability may be laden with affective qualities and can serve 
personal needs to such a degree that objective reality is ignored 
(Shaver, 1975). Because blame is so salient to paranoids, it is 
essential to measure both attributions of causality and attributions 
of blameworthiness made by paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics.
In addition to blame-avoidance, paranoids may be especially 
sensitive to another source of arousal, that of aversive maternal 
control. The most common pattern of the mother-child relationship 
in schizophrenia is the covertly rejecting mother (Reichard and 
Tillman, 1950). This kind of mother dominates the child, but her 
domination takes the form of overprotectiveness to prevent him from 
ever becoming independent. This deters the establishment of a 
sense of interpersonal competence. His sense of worth is further 
reduced by his perception of maternal rejection; if the person who 
knows him best does not communicate love and esteem to him, then he 
must be unlovable and unworthy of esteem. The combination of 
maternal control and maternal rejection act to shape a self-conceptual 
system which reflects the disparagement and doubt found in his
10
mother’s behavior toward him (Heilbrun, 1973).
This situation makes it necessary for him to devise some 
way of adapting to the feedback coming from his mother. The most 
primitive coping mechanisms for dealing with a painful stimulus 
available to the child are tactics of avoidance and withdrawal 
which place physical and psychological distance between the child 
and the mother. The child also learns to direct his attention in 
ways that reduce the input of potentially upsetting cues. This 
social-perceptual style of coping is functionally geared to close 
out the source of aversiveness and has been identified by Heilbrun 
(1973) as the closed adaptive style.
A more sophisticated coping method also described by 
Heilbrun (1973) is the open adaptive style. The child who adopts 
this method attempts.to identify clearly what is expected of him 
in order to elicit positive responses from significant others. He 
continues to relate as closely to the mother as she will allow, 
hoping to replace his sense of rejection with signs of positive 
regard. This mode of coping with the mother as an aversive stimulus 
requires the child’s continuing orietation toward his social 
environment and close attention to interpersonal cues relevant to 
social expectations.
Heilbrun’s (1973) theory of schizophrenic development 
proposes that paranoid schizophrenics, reactive type, have developed 
this open adaptive style as opposed to the closed adaptive style 
adopted by process schizophrenics. Therefore, although aversive
11
maternal control is a common element in the etiology of both groups 
and has had a stressful effect on both, the paranoid stays open to it 
while the process schizophrenic learns to ignore it. In support of 
his position, Heilbrun and Norbert (1971) found that a taped instance 
of aversive maternal control adversely affected the performance of 
paranoid schizophrenics on the Stroop (1935) Color-Word Test while 
the performance of nonparanoid schizophrenics improved.
Therefore, it is likely that paranoid schizophrenics, when 
subjected to an instance of aversive maternal control, will attend 
to it because of their open style of adaptation and because the . 
tape is relevant to their pathology. The arousal, stimulated by 
the aversiveness of the tape, should subsequently provoke a defensive 
response which will, affect their attributions of responsibility. 
Nonparanoid schizophrenics would be less likely to attend to the tape 
because of their closed adaptive style and thus their attributions 
of responsibility should not reflect this arousal.
The overall characterization of reactive paranoids as . 
developmentally and psychologically more sophisticated than process 
nonparanoids, the notion of defensive attribution of responsibility 
in response to threat, and the idea that aversive maternal control
N
is more threatening to reactive paranoids than to process nonparanoids 
combine to suggest four specific hypotheses:
1) In the absence of threat paranoid schizophrenics1 
attributions will reflect a higher level of development than those 
of nonparanoid schizophrenics.
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2) Performance by paranoids on a Stroop test will deteriorate 
during an instance of aversive maternal control while the performance 
of nonparanoids will not, indicating the tape’s arousing affects on 
paranoids.
3) Arousal, stimulated by the aversive maternal tape, will affect 
the attributions of causality and blameworthiness made by paranoid 
schizophrenics but not those of nonparanoid schizophrenics, in 
accordance with their adaptive styles.
4) Personal similarity to a stimulus person involved in 
negative consequences will not produce defensive attributions on the 
part of paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics without additional 
arousal relevant to pathology. When that additional arousal is 
present in the form of aversive maternal cues, defensive attributions 
will be obtained only among paranoids.
Level of sophistication of attributions of responsibility 
made by paranoids and nonparanoids was investigated in a first study 
(designated as Experiment I), and defensive attributions were assessed 
in a second study (designated as Experiment II). The latter was 
designed to investigate the effects of personal similarity on 
attributions of responsibility while keeping situational possibility 
constant, and the effects of arousal produced by Heilbrun’s aversive 
maternal tape. A conceptual replication of Heilbrun and Norbert’s 
(1971) study was included so arousal by the tape could be measured 
for comparison purposes.
13
Experiment I
Method
Subjects. Subjects were 15 paranoid schizophrenics, reactive 
type (9 males, 6 females), and 15 nonparanoid schizophrenics, process 
type (9 males, 6 females), all patients at Eastern State Hospital in 
Williamsburg, Virginia. The mean age of the paranoid schizophrenics 
was 35.6 years and the average length of hospitalization was 2.52 
years. The mean age of .the nonparanoid schizophrenics was 43.7 years 
and the average length of hospitalization was 4.77 years. The 
differences between the two groups in age and length of hospitaliza­
tion were not significant.
Subjects were selected from a group of patients extensively 
interviewed by a clinical psychologist familiar with the research 
design to determine the extent and nature of their delusional systems. 
Patients who were given a diagnosis of paranoid or nonparanoid 
schizophrenia were further selected on the basis of their performance 
on the Ullmann and Giovannoni (1964) measure of the process-reactive 
continuum. In most cases, paranoids who scored 12 or below, and non­
paranoids who scored 13 or above on the Ullmann and Giavannoni index 
were used as subjects. In those cases where there was a qiestion as 
to the veridicality of the patient’s responses to the measure, the 
experimenter relied on the process or reactive classification assigned 
by the clinical psychologist.
Subjects were paid $2.00 for their participation.
Stimulus materials. A modified version of Shaw and Sulzer’s
14
(1964) Attribution of Responsibility Questionnaire (ARQ) was used to 
determine the sophistication of paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics 
in making attributions of responsibility. The questionnaire consists 
of 40 short stories, each one paragraph in length, about a boy named 
Perry who is involved in various situations. The extent of Perry’s 
involvement in the outcome of each story is varied across Heider’s 
five levels. In eight stories, Perry is not present when an incident 
occurs (Association). In another eight stories, Perry’s behavior 
has outcomes which he could not have foreseen (Causality). Perry’s 
behavior has consequences which could have been readily foreseen but 
which he does not willfully produce in eight more stories (Foresee­
ability) . In eight other stories, Perry foresees the outcome of his 
actions and intends to produce the effect (Intentionality). Finally, 
Perry is involved in eight incidents in which his behavior is brought 
on in part by a coercive environment (Justifiability). In Shaw and 
Sulzer’s (1964) original version of the ARQ, the severity of the out­
comes of the eight stories in each level was also varied. Two of the 
eight stories had highly positive outcomes, two had highly negative 
outcomes (brutal death), two had low positive outcomes, and two had 
low negative outcomes.
Three alterations were made in the original ARQ. First, the 
highly negative incidents were reworded so that the outcome would be 
physical harm instead of death. Although this precludes comparison 
of the present severity results to those of Shaw and Sulzer, it 
reduces the likelihood of creating serious trauma in already disturbed
15
patients. A second modification designed to adapt the ARQ for use 
with patients changed the response scale for each item from a five 
point scale of responsibility to a dichotomous judgment. Finally, 
a third modification was to introduce a female stimulus person, Mary, 
for use with female subjects. The two modified ARQ*s (Perry and 
Mary) were then recorded on cassette tapes, and those were played for 
individual subj ects.
Procedure. Subjects were informed of the nature of the 
research and their written permission to participate was obtained.
They listened to the incidents and after each was played they were 
asked to indicate whether Perry or Mary was responsible for the out­
come of the story. Their "yes'1 or "no” response was recorded by the 
experimenter.
Results
At each of the five levels, there were eight opportunities 
for a subject to assign responsibility to the stimulus person, and 
the mean number- of assignments made at each level are shown separately 
for the paranoid and nonparanoid groups in Figure 1. These data 
were subjected to a two-way analysis of variance (Diagnostic Category 
by Levels) with repeated measures on the Levels factor. As the data 
in Figure 1 indicate, both paranoids and nonparanoids made progres­
sively more attributions of responsibility to Levels I through IV, 
with attributions decreasing at Level V (F=74.21; df=4/104; jd < .001).^
■^ The degrees of freedom in this analysis were reduced by the 
fact that ARQ data were unobtainable from two male paranoids.
Fig. 1. Mean number of attributions of responsibility 
made .to Heider's five attributional levels.
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There was, however, a significant interaction between diagnostic 
category and the number of attributions of responsibility made to 
each level (F=4.16; df=4/104; jd <.01), with paranoids making fewer 
attributions of responsibility at Levels I and II and more attribu­
tions of responsibility at Levels III, IV, and V than nonparanoids.
Discussion
This pattern of results provides strong confirmation for 
the first hypothesis. Paranoids make both more attributions at 
the sophisticated levels (III, IV, and V) and fewer attributions at the 
unsophisticated levels (I and II). Paranoids make virtually no attri­
butions of responsibility to stories at Level I (Association) in 
which Perry1s (or Mary’s) friends are the causal agents, and their 
attributions gradually increase to a high at Level IV, where Perry 
intends to cause the effects he produces by his actions. When 
environmental factors operate in a coercive way to help produce 
effects (Level V), the paranoids’ attributions of responsibility 
decrease, as do the attributions of normal adult subjects (Shaw and 
Sulzer, 1964). Nonparanoid schizophrenics assign responsibility 
along the same pattern as paranoids but they are not as discriminating 
as paranoids in making their attributions, particularly at the higher 
levels.
It is possible that the differences found between the para­
noids and nonparanoids on this measure of attributional sophistication 
are related in part to differences in intellectual funtioning.
However, this measure was designed to reflect developmental differences
18
the original research compared the performance of children and adults 
(Shaw and Sulzer, 1964). Shaw and Sulzer have not correlated IQ with 
developmental differences. Therefore, the diagnostic categories seem 
to offer a more satisfying explanation for the differences found. 
Reactive paranoid schizophrenics seem to have developed sufficiently 
to make attributions of responsibility in a normal and sophisticated 
way. Their pathology, especially the distortions which accompany 
their delusional systems, evidently does not interfere when they 
make attributions of responsibility to other persons in the absence 
of arousal. The attributions of nonparanoids reflect their more 
inhibited development.
Experiment II
Method
Subjects. Subjects were the 30 subjects described in 
Experiment I, including the two male paranoids who refused to respond 
to the ARQ.
Stimulus materials and apparatus
Stroop Test. The Stroop (1935) Speed of Color Discrimina­
tion Test developed by the Educational Testing Service was adapted for 
use in this study. Six sheets were taken from a test booklet and were 
placed in transparent plastic binders for protection and ease of 
handling. Two of these sheets had 96 color patches arranged on each 
page. These patches consisted of five colored asterisks in a group, 
in either blue, red, green, or orange. Two sheets had 176 color
19
words, including the words blue, red, green and orange, printed on 
each page. Each color word was printed in the color of ink it named. 
Two other sheets had 176 color words printed on each page but a word 
was never printed in the color ink that it named. Three of the sheets 
were used for the initial Stroop test and the other three, different 
versions of the first three sheets, were used while the aversive 
maternal tape was being played. Brief instructions were typed at the 
top of each sheet so the subjects could refer to them if it was 
necessary.
Incidents. Attributions of cause and blame„were made to 
12 incidents. Each story briefly described a stimulus person, . 
William or Jane, who was involved in a minor accident of the kind 
that could occur in a hospital setting. The stories were carefully 
designed to be ambiguous with respect to causality and blameworthiness 
in order to permit those judgments to be affected by the experimental 
conditions. The stimulus materials were pretested to' insure that the 
situations were of approximately equal ambiguity across the 12 
stories. Similarity to the stimulus person was not manipulated in 
the pretest.
Attribution of responsibility measure. A slot board and 50 
poker chips were used to measure attributions of cause and blame.
The slot board was a wooden board resembling a carrying case for 
poker chips. The board contained five slots into which chips could 
be placed and removed easily, with about one third of the chip 
exposed in front. Each chip represented 2% of the cause or blame
20
to be distributed. The sides of the slots were scaled so the number 
of chips could be determined and recorded by the experimenter. This 
method of measuring cause and blame was used to insure that the 
percentage of cause or blame assigned always summed to 100%. This 
method had the additional advantage of permitting subjects to see 
and adjust the proportion of chips in each slot.
Titles for the slots were typed in capital letters one 
quarter inch high on white cards. These cards could be placed in a 
groove above any slot. Title cards were made for MAIN PERSON, DAVE, 
and MIKE for use while illustrating the procedure, and JANE or 
WILLIAM, OTHER PERSONS, and BAD LUCK for use in the experimental 
manipulation. These title cards were randomly placed in a different 
order on the slot board for different subjects to control for a 
possible position preference.
Aversive maternal tape. The incident of aversive maternal 
control was a duplicate of the tape used extensively by Heilbrun (1973) 
in other experiments. The tape was a scene of a mother severely 
censuring her son for bringing home a poor .report card. The son’s 
attempts to explain and defend himself were abruptly interrupted and 
he was finally reduced to tears. The tape lasted approximately six 
minutes, and the subjects listened to the tape through stethoscope- 
type earphones.
Response booklet. Two female experimenters who did not 
know the research hypotheses actually ran the subjects. Each exper­
imenter was provided with a response booklet for each subject. The
21
first.page was a Form of Consent to Research which was drawn up in 
accordance with the guidelines provided by the hospital’s Patients’ 
Rights Committee. There was a code on this page of the booklet 
which indicated the sex and diagnostic category of the subject for 
whom the booklet should be used. The code also indicated the order 
in which the experimenter was to present the manipulation of personal 
similarity (Similar-Different).
Next, each booklet contained six Xeroxed sheets which 
corresponded to the Stroop sheets presented to the subjects. A letter 
representing the correct color to be named (B, R, G, or 0) was 
placed under each patch and color word. This allowed the experimenter 
to mark quickly in the booklet an error made by a subject. The 
number of seconds the subject required to complete each of the three 
Stroop tasks was recorded with a stopwatch, and was noted at the 
bottom of the response sheet.
The last page of the booklet was designed for the recording 
of the attributions of cause and blame. There were six headings 
across the top: Main Person, Other Persons, and Bad Luck (for record­
ing cause.) and Main Person, Other Persons, and Bad Luck (for recording 
blame). Under the headings were 12 rows of boxes, one row for the 
subject’s responses to each story.
The 12 stories had been randomized into 10 orders so that 
one subject in each group (male paranoid, female paranoid, male non­
paranoid, and female nonparanoid) had the same order of presentation 
but no order was repeated in the same group. This controlled for
any undetected discrepancies in the effectiveness of the stories. The 
rows of boxes in the different booklets were numbered according to the 
various random orders and the experimenter referred to these numbers 
in order to find which story was to be read next. Thus one male 
paranoid might hear story number 7 read under the Similar manipulation 
after the tape had been played while another male paranoid might hear 
the same story under the Different manipulation and before the tape was 
played.
Instruction booklet. The experimenter was also provided 
with written instructions to be read to the subjects. This booklet 
included instructions for the first Stroop test, instructions for 
using the board and chips in evaluating the 12 stories, the 12 stories, 
instructions for the second Stroop test and a page which contained 
one of the four possible orders of the Similar-Different manipulation: 
Similar-different-different-similar when the subject was a male and 
when the subject was a female, and different-similar-similar-different 
when the subject was a male and when the subject was a female. Since 
the wording of the four instances was quite varied, four different 
instruction booklets were constructed, alike except for the presenta­
tion of the similarity manipulation. These booklets were coded on 
the first page. When the experimenter was prepared to run a subject, 
she selected a response booklet which was appropriate for the subject 
in terms of sex and diagnosis, and, noting the required order of the 
Similar-Different presentation coded on the response booklet, she 
then selected an instruction booklet which corresponded to it. As a
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consequence, subjects were assigned to condition orders in advance of 
their arrival at the experimental room, and this assignment was not 
made by the experimenter who actually ran the subject.
Pretests
Three attempts were made to validate our manipulation of 
similarity to the stimulus person. Subjects in these pretests were 
selected at random from the larger hospital population without 
reference to their diagnostic category. At first subjects were asked 
to rate two patients, one similar to the subject and one different 
from the subject, on several scales. Sex, race, age, length of stay 
in the hospital, daytime activity (a job on or off the hospital 
grounds as opposed to ward activities), and the resident building 
were varied for each subject. Included with the description was an 
account of how the patient spent an evening. This account was 
identical for both similar and different patients.
Ten subjects participated in this pretest, and each heard 
a description of a person. Each was asked to imagine that he or she 
was very similar to dr different from the stimulus person in beliefs, 
attitudes, and values (an operationalization of personal similarity 
previously employed by Shaver, 1970). Subjects then rated each 
person on a series of seven-point scales, including likable-unlikable, 
good-bad, similar to yourself-different from yourself; morally account- 
able-not morally accountable, causes everything-doesnVt-cause any­
thing, and situation likely-situation unlikely. These end points 
were separated on the response sheet by words which described the
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various points between them: Extremelyvery, moderately, neither,, 
moderately, very, extremely. Subjects were instructed to circle the 
word they thought best described the person.
It became apparent that including the description of daytime 
activities confused the identification process since some subjects who 
did not have a job at the hospital reported that they perceived them­
selves as workers rather than participants in activities around the 
hopital because they held jobs at home. The activity variable was 
subsequently dropped from the descriptions of the similar and different 
persons. Presented with the remaining variables, 10 subjects again 
failed to consistently identify themselves with the person described 
as similar. Finally, sex, race, and age were varied with eight more 
subjects, without success.
Since many of the variables which have been effective in 
eliciting the identification of normal subjects with a similar person 
(Shaver, 1970, 1973;, Chaikin and Darley, 1973) were not effective with 
a hospital sample, 20 patients, 10 males and 10 females, were asked 
how they would describe a person who was very similar to and very 
different from themselves. Eighteen subjects used personality 
characteristics in their descriptions. These ranged from sensitive, 
warm, and considerate to stupid, stingy, and "hellified." Only two 
subjects mentioned physical characteristics. None of the variables 
that had been manipulated was mentioned. After ruling out race and 
age as means of manipulating similarity, it was decided to let sub­
jects reach the same point by providing their own descriptions of
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similarity, with only the sex of the stimulus person varied by the 
experimenter. Sex has been used before in successful manipulations 
of similarity (Shaver, 1970; Shaver and Carroll, 1970), and the philoso­
phy of permitting subjects to reach the same point in manipulation of 
the conceptual variable through slight variations in instructions has 
been supported by Aronson and Carlsmith (196S).
Procedure
The subjects were run individually by one of two female 
experimenters trained by the author, neither of whom knew the hypotheses 
of the research. After being seated in the interview room, each sub­
ject read a Form of Consent to Research which explained the nature 
of the investigation and reviewed his rights as a patient and a par­
ticipant. After the subject signed the consent form, the experimenter 
asked him how he would describe someone who is "very similar" to him­
self. This description was noted for use later in the experiment.
Subjects were then asked to take the Stroop test. This 
consisted of three tasks. For the first task, subjects named aloud 
the color of ink patches; next they read the color words; for the 
third task, they named the color of the ink in which each color word 
was printed. The experimenter read instructions describing each task 
before that task was begun and brief instructions were typed at the 
top of each task page. Subjects were instructed to work quickly but 
carefully and were told that time would be kept. The experimenter 
used the response booklet containing keys to the correct responses to 
mark errors as they occurred. The number of seconds it took to
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complete each task was noted at the bottom of the page.
After completing the three parts of the Stroop test, the sub­
jects were given instructions in the distribution of the poker chips 
to evaluate the 12 stories. They were asked to assign the cause, de­
fined as who or what made the accident happen, and the blame, defined 
as who or what might deserve to be punished for what happened in each 
story, by distributing the poker chips across three categories: 
Stimulus person, (called main person); other persons, such as:.friends 
nurses, doctors, or aides; or bad luck. It was emphasized that the
chips could be distributed in any way. They could be put in a single
slot, split between two slots, or some could be put in each slot, as
long as all the chips were used. Slots were clearly labeled with the
appropriate title card. The ..experimenter placed the JANE or WILLIAM 
card over the stimulus person slot, depending on who the stimulus 
person was at the time. An example story was used to illustrate the 
instructions, and subjects were asked to attribute cause and blame 
from that story to familiarize themselves with the procedure.
Before the aversive maternal tape was played, each paranoid 
and nonparanoid schizophrenic was read three stories in which the 
stimulus person was described as Similar to the subject, and three 
stories in which the stimulus person was described as Different from 
the subject. This similarity manipulation was based on the sex of 
the subject, and on the subject's own previous description of a 
similar person. The order of presentation of the manipulation was 
counterbalanced in an ABBA and BAAB design within diagnostic
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classification, and the order of presentation of the 12 stories was 
completely randomized across subjects. Subjects were asked to remember 
that they were similar to, or different from the stimulus person in 
each story right before they distributed the poker chips to assign 
causality and blame for that story.
After the second series of stories was read and attributions 
were made, subjects were informed that they would hear a tape of a 
mother speaking to her son. They were told that they would take 
another parallel form of the Stroop test while listening to the tape 
through earphones. The instructions for the three Stroop tasks were 
reviewed and subjects were reminded that these instructions were 
printed at the top of each Stroop page. As before, they were told 
that their work was being timed and were encouraged to work as quick­
ly as. possible without making mistakes. The earphones were put on, 
the tape was begun, and the volume was adjusted for each subject.
They listened to the tape for one minute before they were instructed 
to begin on the first Stroop task. The tape was played until all 
three tasks were completed.
Immediately after the Stroop was complete, three more 
Similar stories and three more Different stories were read to the 
subjects in the appropriate order.... Subjects were again reminded 
that Jane and William, were very similar or very different from the 
ways they described themselves and were urged to keep this in mind 
when attributing cause and blame.
Results
Preliminary analyses of the data separated by sex of subject 
revealed no significant differences on any measures attributable to 
subject’s sex. All the analyses reported below, therefore, are for 
combined data. The Stroop test results have been analyzed as a 
2x2 (Diagnosis by Tape) factorial design with repeated measures 
(before-during) on the Tape factor, because the second manipulated 
factor (Similarity to stimulus person) was irrelevant to the Stroop 
test. For purposes of comparison, ..our analysis was performed on an 
efficiency score for each task (i.e., the number of correct responses 
per second). This was derived, following Heilbrun and Norbert, by 
dividing the number of correct responses by the number of seconds 
taken to complete the task. The mean efficiency scores for each of the 
three Stroop tasks are presented in Table 1, and the predicted 
interaction was obtained on only one of these measures. The analyses 
for all attribution measures are 2x2x2 (Diagnosis by Tape by 
Similarity) factorial designs (repeated measures on factors two and 
three), because here the similarity was relevant to the data collected. 
Stroop Test
The previous work of Heilbrun and Norbert (1971) showed that 
performance by the paranoid subjects deteriorated during the aversive 
maternal tape, but that performance during the tape by nonparanoids 
improved. Although the improvement of nonparanoids has no adequate 
theoretical explanation, Heilbrun and Norbert argued that the perfor­
mance decrement by paranoids was the result of their open adaptive
Tab le 1 
Mean Efficiency Scores
Before
Paranoids Nonparanoids Paranoids
Color patch
1.20 0.87 1.10
Read Word
1.70 1.51 1.43
Name Ink
0.65 0.56 0.67
After
Nonparanoids
0.94 
1.47 
0.61
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style. In the present research an interaction between- diagnosis and 
tape would have been sufficient to confirm Heilbrun and NorbertTs 
earlier findings. Performance of the paranoids did deteriorate during 
the tape on the first Stroop task, naming the color patch, while 
performance of the nonparanoids improved„(F=5.95; df=1/28; jd < .05). 
For the second Stroop measure, naming the color word, there was no 
interaction, but there was a main effect showing decreased performance 
by both paranoids and nonparanoids during the playing of the tape 
(F=4.37; df=l/28; < .05). There were no significant differences in
the performance of paranoids and nonparanoids before and during the 
tape for the third Stroop task, naming the ink in which the words 
were printed.
Attribution Measures
Causality. The most stringent test of the combination of 
defensive attribution predictions with aversive maternal control 
predictions is a three-way interaction, with paranoid subjects show­
ing increased attribution to the similar stimulus person before the 
aversive tape, but decreased attribution to the similar stimulus 
person after the tape has been played. The mean scores across condi­
tions for both causality and blame attributions are presented in 
Table 2. The means for causality reveal that the three-way inter­
action was not obtained. Indeed, there were no significant differences 
in causality attributions based on diagnostic classification. There 
was, however, a significant two-way interaction in the predicted 
direction, with both paranoids and nonparanoids showing decreases in
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causality attributed to the Similar stimulus person after the tape, 
and increases in causality attributed to the Different stimulus person 
after the tape (]?=4.20; df=l/28; £  <.05). It is interesting to note 
that this predicted difference occurred despite an overall tendency by 
both paranoids and nonparanoids to attribute more causality to the 
Similar stimulus person (F=4.01; df=1/28; £  < .10), and away from 
others when the stimulus person was Similar 0^=5.19; df=1/28; £  <  .05).
Blame. On the basis of findings with normal subjects 
(Shaver, 1970), it was predicted that the same interaction expected 
for causality would also occur for blame. In fact, with normals, 
blame-avoidance seems to be the more important issue (Chaiken and 
Darley, 1973; Shaver, 1973). The blame attribution means are presented 
in Table 2, and these show that the expected interaction was not ob­
tained. Particularly in light of the causality findings, it is intri­
guing that the only blame attribution differences were trends toward 
main effects based on diagnostic category. Paranoid subjects tended 
to attribute less blame to the stimulus person (whether Similar or 
Different) than did nonparanoids (F=3.25; df=1/28; £  < .10), and to 
attribute more blame to bad luck than did nonparanoids (F=3.59; 
df=l/28; £  <.10).
Age and Chronlcity. Any study conducted with hospitalized 
patients must take into account the possible contamination of diagnos­
tic category by length of hospitalization. Although our paranoid and 
nonparanoid groups did not differ significantly either in age (jt=2.02; 
df=28; £  < .10) or in length of hospitalization (_t=2-02; df=28; £  <  .10),
33
there might have been some selective effects on individual dependent 
variables. To check this possibility, both age and length of hospital­
ization of paranoid and nonparanoid subjects were correlated with the 
six Stroop performance measures (three efficiency scores before and 
three scores during the tape) and the 24 attribution measures (cause 
and blame attributed to stimulus person, other persons, and bad luck when 
the stimulus person was similar and when he was different, before and 
after the tape). There was one significant negative correlation 
(r=-.529; df=13; jd <.05) between the paranoids1 length of hospitali­
zation and the Stroop performance measures, and one significant 
negative correlation between the nonparanoids1 length of hospitaliza­
tion and the attribution measures (r=-.54Q; df=13; 2. < *05). These 
do not fall into a consistent pattern, so given the number of differ­
ent correlations involved (a total of 60) they may be regarded as 
chance findings. With regard to age, there were no significant 
correlations between the nonparanoids1 ages and the attribution 
measures. However, five of the six Stroop measures correlated nega­
tively with the nonparanoids1 ages. .
In order to compare the Stroop performance of the younger 
nonparanoid subjects with that of the older nonparanoid subjects, 
these subjects were separated by a median split into two age groups, 
and a 2x2 (Age Group by Tape) factorial design with repeated measures 
(before-during) on the Tape factor was used to analyze the data.
The mean scores of Stroop efficiency for these two age groups are 
shown in Table 3. For the first Stroop task, naming the color patch,
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Table 3 
Mean Efficiency Scores 
Before After
Younger Older Younger
Color patch
110.57 66.13 113.14
Read word
173.86 130.00 182.29
Name ink
73.43 39.88 80.71
Older
77.00
115.50
44.25
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young nonparanoids performed significantly more efficiently than did 
the older nonparanoids (F=6.53; df=1/13; jd <,05). Younger nonpara­
noids also performed significantly more efficiently than older non­
paranoids on the second Stroop task, naming the color word (F=5.60; 
df=l/13; ]> < .05). On the third Stroop task, naming the ink in which 
the words were printed, younger nonparanoids again performed signifi­
cantly more efficiently than older nonparanoids (F=13.25; df=l/13;
<  .01). Also, the performance of both younger and older nonpara­
noids improved significantly during the tape CF=5.20; df=l/13; jd <.05). 
There were no significant interactions.
The correlations and their analysis indicate that younger 
nonparanoids perform more efficiently than older nonparanoids on a 
cognitive task. This is not a surprising finding. It is reasonable 
to expect that older adults will not perform as well as younger 
adults on a task that requires concentration and accuracy under 
timed conditions. Since the age of nonparanoids did not correlate 
with attribution measures and no interactions were found between 
Age Group and Tape, the possibility of age as an artifact is minimized.
Discussion
Aversive Maternal Control
Explicit in Heilbrun*s (1973) theory of paranoid development 
is the notion that there is a specific sensitivity on the part of 
paranoid schizophrenics to the hostile, censuring behavior of a mother, 
as evidenced by the disruptive effects of these cues on the perfor­
mance of a cognitive task, i.e., the Stroop. Heilbrun and Norbert
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(1971) maintain that the performance of paranoids on the Stroop 
deteriorates during the aversive maternal tape because the tape has 
an emotionally arousing nature which upsets them. Because of their 
closed style of adaptation, nonparanoid schizophrenics supposedly are 
not sensitive to these same aversive cues. Their improved perfor­
mance on the Stroop during the tape is pointed out by Heilbrun to 
support this assumption.
The results of the present study suggest that paranoids and 
nonparanoids do respond initially to the tape in line with their re­
spective adaptive styles, but that what is measured by the Stroop is 
the ability or lack of ability to concentrate on a task during exter­
nal stimulation. As performance time proceeds, the tape has a deli- 
terious affect on the performance of nonparanoids as well as paranoids, 
indicating that after prolonged exposure to the tape, the tape affects 
their attention or concentration also. Finally, both paranoids and 
nonparanoids seem able to recover their concentration and perform as 
well on the third task as they did before they heard the tape, even 
though the third task is the most susceptable to intrusion of the 
reading response (it is the same task measured by Heilbrun and 
Norbert, 1971).
The present research calls into question Heilbrun’s explan­
ation for the results Heilbrun and Norbert found in their investiga­
tion, and a methodological comparison is suggested. The Stroop test 
administered by Heilbrun and Norbert required naming the ink in which 
144 color words were printed. This task is of limited duration
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compared to ours. It is possible that Heilbrun and Norbert did 
not allow their subjects enough time to show the range of their 
responses to the tape. In the case of paranoids, the task was 
completed before they could recover their concentration and deal 
with the distraction of the tape. In the case of nonparanoids, the 
task was completed before the distracting properties of the tape 
affected their performance.
Heilbrun may be correct in his assumptions that reactive 
paranoids have adopted an open adaptive style while process .nonpara­
noids have adopted a closed adaptive style in response to aversive 
mothering. However, it appears that the Stroop tasks measure the 
cognitive effects of the tape by measuring distractability. The 
distracting properties of the tape, as far as they are relevant to 
a cognitive task, seem belatedly to affect nonparanoids, and then 
seem to wear off as the task continues. This study reveals that 
the Stroop may not be adequate to measure the concurrent emotional 
components of aversive maternal cues for both paranoid and non­
paranoid schizophrenics.
It could be argued that the pattern of performance on the 
Stroop reflects a successful repression of emotional arousal instead 
of a distraction which is overcome. The effects of the tape on at­
tributions of causality seem to preclude that argument. Some of 
the attribution measures seem to reflect the emotional nature of the 
“tape and its significance for paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics.
Finally, if Heilbrun1s theory of emotional interference on
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the part of paranoid schizophrenics alone were correct., we would 
expect to find corresponding Diagnosis by Tape interactions on the 
attribution measures. This interaction did not occur for any of the 
attribution measures. This is further evidence that the Stroop is 
inadequate = for measuring emotional arousal for both paranoids and 
nonparanoids. Attribution measures may offer a better way to 
reflect arousal, particularly in the context of this study.
Defensive Attribution
The attribution results, themselves, suggest that conditions 
which produce defensive attributions in noninstitutionalized subjects 
(situational possibility and personal similarity) do not do so with 
schizophrenic subjects. Instead, these conditions appear to produce 
an internalization of the causality that normals externalize; both 
paranoids and nonparanoids tend to attribute cause most often to the 
stimulus person described as similar to themselves. I base a 
possible explanation for this internalization on personal experience 
with schizophrenics in a hospital setting. This internalization on 
the part of paranoids and nonparanoids might be explained in light of 
the feelings of helplessness that ofter characterize a schizophrenic, 
feelings that he is not in control of his situation while being very 
involved in it. Out of these feelings of helplessness may come a 
great deal of "personalizing" about what occurs in the world: A
schizophrenic may perceive that events are revolving around him, with­
out his knowing or understanding why. He may come to believe that 
he either stimulates events or is the actual cause for those events,
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even when they have little or nothing to do with him. For instance, 
a patient might feel that he caused Watergate, although he cannot 
articulate in what ways he was connected with the affair. Under 
conditions of minimal threat, schizophrenics apparently reflect this 
personalization in their attributions of cause.
With the addition of the aversive maternal tape, the attri­
butions of schizophrenics correspond closely to the defensive attri­
butions of normals. The subjects attribute more causality to the 
Different stimulus person and less causality to the Similar stimulus 
person. At least two possible explanations for these results suggest 
themselves: Schizophrenics may have a higher threshhold for the
sorts of threat that usually produce defensive attributions, or 
perhaps they respond only to a psychologic«tf(y appropriate threat, the 
tape.. In either case, the aversive maternal tape has an arousing 
effect on both paranoids and nonparanoids under these experimental 
conditions.
It is clear that the avoidance of blame is the single most 
relevant factor affecting the attributions made by paranoid schizo­
phrenics. In all their attributions of blame, those made before and 
after the tape, and those made to Similar and Different stimulus 
persons, paranoids tended to attribute blame away from the stimulus 
person. While they dealt differentially with attributions of cause, . 
depending on the experimental manipulations, their^attributions of 
blame reflect their high need for blame avoidance (Chambers, 1975) 
and the clinically observed tendency to transfer blame (Sullivan, 1965).
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Another important aspect of the attributions of blame made by 
paranoids is the tendency to attribute blame to bad luck. This is 
again consistent with paranoids* avoidance of blame when punishment 
or retaliation are possible. Since the "other persons" category 
referred to peers and persons in authority such as doctors, nurses, 
and aides, the paranoids apparently felt more comfortable about 
transfering blame to an ambivalent and possibly less threatening 
category.
Nonparanoids did not internalize blame as they did cause, 
and the tape did not produce a change in their attributions of blame. 
Perhaps another defense mechanism, such as denial, was operating 
when nonparanoids attributed blame. The results suggest either that 
blame is not relevant to nonparanoids or that they respond to it with 
a defense mechanism that makes it appear that they aren't threatened 
by it.
The contribution of this research is to add to our under­
standing of the ways in which schizophrenics attribute causality and 
blame, and to extend defensive attribution theory to an institution­
alized population. Although many questions have been raised, we have 
found that paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenics tend to make 
defensive attributions consistent with their pathology. Future 
research may help to discover the dynamics behind these attributional 
patterns.
Appendix
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Appendix A 
Ullmaniv-Giovannoni Scale
1. I am married now.
2. I have fathered children.
3. I have been married.
4. Before I was seventeen I had left the home I was raised
in and never went back except for visits.
5. When I leave the hospital, I will live with one or both
of my parents.
6. As a civilian I have worked steadily at one job or for 
one employer for over two years.
7. I. finished at least one year of education after high 
school— trade apprenticeship, business school, 
college, etc.
8. Adding up all the money I earned for the last three 
years, it comes to less than $700, before deductions.
9. In my teens I was a member of a group of friends who 
did things together.
10. I hardly ever went over to another kidTs house after 
school or on weekends.
11. When I was in school I didn*t like Physical. Education 
classes.
12. Alcohol has nothing to do with my difficulties.
Reactive
True
True
True
True
False
True
True
False
True
False
False
False
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20. 
21. 
22.
23.
24.
I have paid regularly to buy a house.
More than once in the last year I have stayed on after 
some group meeting and talked with some other members 
about something that went on.
Shortly before I came-into the hospital there was some 
major change in my life— such as marriage, birth of a 
baby, death, injury, loss of job, etc.
I have been deeply in love with someone and have told 
them about it.
In the kinds of work I do, it is expected that people 
will stay for at least a year.
My top wage in the last five years was less than $1.50 
an hour.
I have earned my living for longer than a year at 
full-time civilian work.
I have had to stay in a mental hospital for more than 
one year at a time.
Within the last five years I have spent more than half 
of the time in a mental hospital.
In my teens I was a regular member of a club or 
organization that had a grown-up who came to meetings 
(Scouts, school club, 4-H, church youth club, etc.)
In my teens there was more than one girl with whom I 
had more than two dates.
When I leave the hospital, I will live with my wife.
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True
True
True
True
True
False
True
False
False
True
True
True
Appendix B
Attribution of Responsibility Questionnaire 
(modified)
Perry was watching a house that was burning down. As he watched, 
a small child appeared at a window and called for help. Most of 
the people thought there was so much fire that no one should go 
in the house. Perry ran in and pulled the child to safety. Is 
Perry responsible for saving the childfs life? (Level IV)
One day several of Perry’s classmates were playing by the lake.
Perry was not with them. They found a fishing rod in the bushes
and broke it into pieces. Is Perry responsible for the fishing 
rod being broken? (Level I)
Perry carried a bucket of water to the yard so that he could wash 
the family car. Then he went back to get the soap. A thirsty 
bird flew down and got a drink of water from the bucket. Is 
Perry responsible for the bird getting a drink of water? (Level II) 
A man grabbed Perry by the shirt collar and threatened to hurt 
him if he did not splash mud on an old man who was walking by.
Perry splashed the mud on the old man’s best shoes. Is Perry 
responsible for the old man’s best shoes getting mud on them?
(Level V)
Perry woke up in the middle of the night and saw that the house
next door was on fire. He was frightened and woke up his father
to ask him if he could sleep in his parents’ room. His father
ran to the house and saved two old people who were.trapped in the 
burning house. Is Perry responsible for saving the two people? 
(Level III)
6. Perry called a boy and asked him to come over to his house to see 
his birthday presents. On the way to Perry’s house the boy was 
struck by a car and was killed. Is Perry responsible for the 
boy’s death? (Level II) .
7. One day when Perry was absent from school some of the boys in his 
class helped a lady pull weeds from her garden. Is Perry respon­
sible for the weeds being pulled from the garden? (Level I)
8. Perry was helping his father unload some rocks from a truck. One 
of the rocks he threw missed the pile and crashed through the 
window of a nearby building. Is Perry responsible for the 
broken window? (Level III)
9. A. little boy was lost in a large cave. Everyone was afraid to 
go in the cave because they might get lost too. A much bigger 
boy told Perry he would knock his head off if he did not go 
hunt for the lost boy. Perry went into the cave, found the boy 
and brought him to safety. Is Perry responsible for saving the 
little boy’s life? (Level V)
10. Perry put medicine in a coca cola and gave it to another boy.
The boy drank the coke and got sick from the medicine. Is Perry 
responsible for the boy getting sick? (Level IV)
11. After supper, Perry put some meat scraps into the garbage can. A 
hungry dog came along and ate the meat scraps. Is Perry :
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responsible for the hungry dog getting some food? (Level III)
12. Perry was cutting the grass in front of his house. A rock got
into the mower and was thrown across the yard. It broke a 
window in the house next door. Is Perry responsible for the 
broken window? (Level,II)
13. Perry had been playing with classmates in a tree. While he was 
gone home for lunch, some of the boys decided to hurt another 
boy. They pushed him out of the tree and his neck was hurt.
Is Perry responsible for the boy getting hurt? (Level I)
14. Perry saw a boy building a block tower. Perry threw a ball at
the tower and knocked it down. Is Perry responsible for the tower 
being knocked down? (Level IV)
15. One day it was raining very hard. A man told Perry he would
whip him if he did not take an umbrella to a woman getting out
of a car in the rain. Perry took the umbrella to the woman and 
she was able to get in out of the rain without getting wet. Is 
Perry responsible for the woman not getting wet? (Level V)
16. One day when Perry was at the dentist’s office, the boys in his 
class went swimming. While there, they saved a little boy from 
drowning. Is Perry responsible for saving the little boy’s 
life? (Level I)
17. Perry had an old bicycle which had no brakes. He told his sister 
to ride it to the store several blocks away. When she came to a 
busy street, she could not stop the bicycle and ran into the path 
of a car and was hurt. Is Perry responsible for his sister being '
hurt? (Level III)
18. Perry saw someone’s coat on the floor and picked it up so that
it would not get dirty. Is Perry responsible for the coat not 
getting dirty? (Level IV)
19. A small child had fallen into a swimming pool and was drowning.
Perry didn’t know the child was in the pool, but just at that
time he was draining the pool so he could clean it. The water 
ran out quickly and the child’s life was saved. Is Perry 
responsible for saving the child’s life? (Level II)
20. Another boy tried to hurt Perry with a large stick. Perry grabbed
the stick and hit the other boy over the head with it to keep
from being hurt himself. Is Perry responsible for the boy being 
hurt? (Level V)
21. Perry was absent from school the day his class lost the relay 
race. Is Perry responsible for his class losing the relay race? 
(Level I)
22. Perry was fishing when he saw a boy drowning in the river. Perry
could not swim, but he fought his way out to the boy and pulled
him out. Is Perry responsible for saving the boy’s life?
(Level IV)
23. While Perry was cleaning the garage, he found some old shoes.
He put them on the trash pile. The garbage man found them and 
kept them for himself. Is Perry responsible for the man getting 
some shoes? (Level II)
24. A man was twisting Perry’s arm so much it hurt. He ordered
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Perry to break a store window. Perry broke the window. Is 
Perry responsible for the window being broken? (Level V)
25. Perry was taking his little sister to school. She started to 
step into a busy street but Perry wanted to look in a store 
window, so he pulled her back. This kept his sister from being 
hit by a speeding car. Is Perry responsible for saving his 
sister1s life? (Level III)
26. Perry told some people about a short-cut to the next town. They:
took the short-cut but as they were crossing a river the bridge
broke. Their car fell into the river and the people were hurt.
Is Perry responsible for the people getting hurt? (Level II)
27. Perry was at home in bed the day his class won the baseball 
game. Is Perry responsible for winning the baseball game?
(Level I)
28. Perry was at a party. When the cookies were passed, Perry took
five. There were not enough to go around and one of the boys
got none. Is Perry responsible for the boy. not getting any 
cookies? (Level III)
29. A small child had crawled into the pasture with a very mean 
bull that had gored several people. The little boy's brother 
who was bigger than Perry picked up a stick and told Perry that 
he would hit him if he did not go into the pasture and save the 
child. Perry dashed in front of the angry bull and pulled the 
child to safety. Is Perry responsible for saving the child? 
(Level V)
30. Perry was playing with another boy. He became angry with the
other boy so he hit him with a stick he had been playing with. Is
Perry responsible for the boy being hit by the stick? (Level IV)
31. Perry had tickets to the movies but he could not go. He left the 
tickets on the hall table. His sister found the tickets and went 
to the movies. Is Perry responsible for his sister getting free 
tickets? (Level III)
32. Perry was coming through the door into a restaurant. Just as
he opened,the door, a waitress was passing with a tray of dishes. 
The door struck her arm, causing her to drop the tray and break 
the dishes. Is Perry responsible for the dishes being broken? 
(Level II)
33. One day after Perry had gone home from school, some other boys
in his class beat up a child. Is Perry responsible for the child 
being beaten up? (Level I)
34. Perry threw some broken glass into a man's driveway so that he
would get a flat tire. The man drove in and got a flat tire.
Is Perry responsible for the man getting the flat tire? (Level IV)
35. Perry’s mother said she would whip him if he did not cut the grass.
Is Perry responsible.for the lawn looking nice? (Level V)
36. One day after Perry had gone home from school, the boys in his
class pulled a small child from the path of a speeding automobile. 
Is Perry responsible for saving the child’s life? (Level I)
37. Perry was playing with some bricks on the roof of.his father’s 
garage. When he was tired of playing with the bricks, he began
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tossing them down to the sidewalk. A woman coming down the 
sidewalk was struck on the head and was hurt by one of the 
falling bricks. Is Perry responsible for the woman being hurt? 
(Level III)
38. While he was on the way to the park, Perry found a newspaper.
When he got to the park, he gave it to an old man sitting on a 
park bench. Is Perry responsible for the old man getting a free 
newspaper? (Level IV)
39. Perry was making telephone calls to several of his friends.
When the phone rang in one home he called, it awakened a man
who was sleeping near a broken gas stove. If he had not awakened, 
the leaking gas would have killed him.- Is Perry responsible 
for the man waking up in time to escape death? (Level II)
AO. Perry was taking some money to the bank for his father. A man
attacked and threatened him with a knife if he did not give him 
the money. Perry picked up a rock, hit the man on the head and 
hurt him. Is Perry resppnsible for hurting the man? (Level V)
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Appendix C 
Attribution Incidents
1. Jane was lying in bed smoking. Her doctor had increased her 
medication and she felt drowsy. She fell asleep and the bed 
caught fire. Who caused the bed to catch fire? Who is to blame 
for the bed catching fire?
2. Jane was late for dinner because she had been doing an errand 
for the nurse. She ran all the way to the cafeteria. She 
bumped into a cafeteria employee who was carrying a tray of 
glasses. The employee dropped the tray and all the glasses 
broke. Who caused the glasses to break? Who is to blame for 
the broken glasses?
3. A patient was mopping the floor of her ward. . She left the mop 
leaning against the wall while she helped another patient make 
her bed. While she was away, Jane tripped over the mop, lost 
her balance and fell, spilling the bucket of water. Who caused 
the water to be spilled? Who is to blame for the spilled water?
4. Jane was in occupational therapy washing some paint brushes in 
the sink when the teacher asked her to run an errand. She left 
to do the errand, but forgot to turn off the water all the way. 
While she was gone the sink overflowed and the water spilled on
T
the projects of several other people. Some of the projects were 
ruined. Who caused the projects to be ruined? Who is to blame 
for the ruined projects?
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5. Jane was in gym class learning to roller skate. Her teacher 
wanted her to try to go around the gym alone. She started off 
okay but when she tried to stop she couldnft and she banged into
the gym door. The glass in the door broke. Who caused the glass
to break? Who is to blame for the broken glass?
6. Jane and a group of patients went swimming at a nearby river.- 
After swimming the teacher told everyone to go change. Jane was 
slow in changing and the group had to look for her. The group 
was late for supper. Who caused the group to be late for supper? 
Who is to blame for the group being late?
7* Jane and another patient were doing exercises in the day room.
The other patient told some jokes and they started laughing real 
hard and playing- around. Jane lost her balance and fell back into
the TV. It broke. Who caused the TV to be broken? Who is to
blame for the broken TV?
8. Jane asked the nurse to give her a pass so she could go to town
*
for a job interview. The nurse said no and she got angry and 
turned around really fast. When she turned around, she bumped 
into an aide who was carrying a tray of medications. All the 
medications were spilled. Who caused the medications to be
spilled? Who is to blame for the spilled medications?
9. A patient was sitting in the day room smoking but left for a 
few minutes when the nurse motioned for her to come to the 
nurses1 station. She left a pack of cigarettes on the couch.
Jane came into the dayroom to watch TV and sat on the patient’s
cigarettes, crushing them. Who caused the cigarettes to be 
crushed? Who is to blame for the crushed cigarettes?
10. Jane was in gym class throwing a medicine ball with some other 
patients. A friend motioned to her to throw the ball to him.
Jane threw it and the ball hit her friend in the face. His 
glasses broke. Who caused the glasses to be broken? Who is to 
blame for the broken glasses?
Jane was in a store shopping for a gift. She saw something 
she really liked and wanted to touch, but it was very breakable 
and she thought she shouldnTt. A friend who was with her urged 
her to pick it up anyway. She did and she dropped it. The gift
broke. Who caused the gift to break? Who is to blame for the
broken gift?
Jane was in the cafeteria line waiting for supper. A friend who
was way ahead in the line saw her and asked her to come up and
cut into the line. When she cut in, she bumped into someone with 
a tray. The tray fell and the food splattered everywhere. Who 
caused the food to be spilled? Who is to blame for the spilled 
food?
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Appendix D 
Instructions 
Instructions for the Stroop test
First I am going to ask you to take a color-naming test. 
These are patches of four different colors— red, blue, green, and 
orange. You are to tell me the color of each patch as it appears 
on a page like this one. Time is important so please name the colors 
of the patches.as quickly as you can without making errors. Your 
performance will be timed. Begin at the top of the page and work 
each row from left to right. Don’t leave out any patches. Do you 
have any question? Okay, ready, begin.
These are the names of four colors printed in different 
colored inks. For example, the name "orange" may be printed in 
either blue, red, green, or orange ink. Here are some samples.
This time you are to read the word that is printed. Read these as 
quickly as you can without making errors because time is important. 
Your performance will be timed. Please begin at the top of the 
page and work each row from left to right. Don’t leave out any words. 
Any question? Okay, ready, begin.
Now I would like you to name the color of the ink that the 
word is printed in. Don’t pay.any attention to the word itself.
Work as quickly as you can without making mistakes because time is
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important. Again, your performance will be timed. Would you please 
try these samples first? Any questions? Okay, ready, begin.
I ’m going to put these earphones on you now and you will 
hear a mother speaking to her son. While you are listening to the 
tape I am going to ask you to take the color-naming test again, 
starting with the color patches. On the first page, please name the 
color of each patch. On the next page, you will read the words that 
are printed on the page. Finally, on the last page you will name 
the color of the ink that the word is printed in. The instructions 
are printed at the top of each page in case you forget them.
Please remember that your work is being timed so it is 
important for you to work as quickly as you can without making mis­
takes. Begin at the top of the page and work each row from left to 
right. Don't leave out any patches or words. Do you have any 
questions? I will start the tape now. (One m i n u t e ) O k a y , ready, begin.
Instructions for the 12 incidents
We will use the earphones and tape recorder later, but they 
aren't working now.
I am going to read 12 stories to you. After I read each 
story I would like you first to show me who causes what happens in 
the story and then to show me who is to blame for what happens.
You'll do this by using this slot board and these chips.
The board has three slots in it that stand for something. This slot
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stands for the "main person"— either Jane or William, depending on 
the story. This stands for "other persons" like friends, nurses, 
doctors, or aides. This last slot stands for "bad luck." These 
chips stand for the total amount of cause or the total amount of 
blame. The idea is for you to divide all of these chips up between 
the three slots to show first how much each of these causes what
happens in the story and then how much each is to blame. The amount
of chips you put in each slot shows how much you think it causes 
what happens or how much you think it is to blame for what happens. 
The more chips you put in a slot, the more cause or blame you are 
showing for that slot.
For example, suppose I told you about a guy named Dave, 
who got in trouble for breaking a window. He was throwing a ball . 
around with some of his friends. He threw.it real hard to a guy 
named Mike. Now Mike missed it and the ball hit a window and the 
window broke. The question is, who caused and who is to blame for 
the broken window.
Okay, first you show me who caused what happened. We say
someone causes something when they are the person who makes the
thing happen. This slot is for Dave since he is the main person in 
the story. If you think Dave caused the window to be broken since 
he threw the ball, you put lots of chips in his slot. If you don’t 
think Dave caused the broken window even though he threw the ball, 
then you wouldn’t put any chips in his slot. This slot is for 
"other persons." If you think Dave’s friend Mike caused the window
to be broken since he didnTt catch the ball, you put lots of chips in 
the "other persons" slot. If you think that Mike didn’t cause the 
broken window,, even though he missed the ball, then you would put 
only a few chips in his slot, or none at all. Now this is the "bad 
luck" slot. If you think that neither Dave nor his friend Mike caused 
the window to break, but that it was because of bad luck, you put lots 
of chips in this slot. But if you think that bad luck didn’t have 
much to do with the window’s breaking, then you would put only a few 
or no chips in this slot.
Finally, you can share the cause between the three slots in 
any way you want— put all of them in a single slot, some in each slot, 
or split them among any two slots, just as long as you use all the 
chips. Why don’t you distribute the chips now and show me who or 
what you think caused the broken window.
Now, when showing who is to blame for what happened, that is, 
who might deserve to be punished, you use all the chips again, putting 
chips in the slots according to how much or how little blame you think 
belongs there. You can put whatever amount of chips you want to in 
each slot as long as you use all the.chips. Do you have any questions 
Okay, who or what do you think is to blame for the broken window?
This story about Dave is just an example we use to show you 
how to use the board and chips. The stories I will read now are 
different, but the way you show me who causes and who is to blame for 
what happens is the same.
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Instructions for women subjects; Similar-different
You know, Jane, who is the main person in the next three
stories, is very similar to you. She is also ,  , and
_________. I want you to remember that she is very similar to you when
showing me who causes and who is to blame for what happens in the
stories about her. Please remember that someone causes something 
when they are the person that makes the thing happen. When someone 
is to blame, they might deserve to be punished for what happens.
read three stories 
You know, William, the main person in the next three stories, 
is very, very different from the way you described yourself. He is 
not like you at all. I’d like you to remember that when showing me 
who causes and who is to blame for what happens in the stories about 
him.
read three stories— then tape 
The next three stories are about William. When you show me
who causes and who is to blame for what happens, please remember that 
he is very different from you.
read three stories 
The next stories are about Jane. When you show me who causes 
and who is to blame for what happens, please remember that she is 
very similar to you.
Instructions for women subjects: Different-similar
You know, William, the main person in the next three stories,
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is very, very different from the way you described yourself. He is 
not like you at all. I fd like you to remember that when showing me 
who causes and who is to blame for what happens in the stories about 
him. Please remember that someone causes something when they are the 
person that makes the thing happen. When someone is to blame, they 
might deserve to be punished for what happens.
readthree stories 
You know, Jane, the main person in the next three stories,
is very similar to you. She is also , '_____ , and ________
I want you to remember that she is very similar to you when showing 
me who causes and who is to blame for what happens in the stories 
about her.
read three stories— then tape 
The next stories are about.Jane. When you show me who 
causes and who is to blame for what happens, please remember that she 
is very similar to you.
read three stories 
The next three stories are about William. Please remember 
that he is very different from you when showing me who causes and who 
is to blame for what happens.
Instructions for male subjects: Similar-different
You know, William, who is the main person in the next three
stories, is very similar . to you. He is also _______  , , and
...... . - . I want you to remember that he is very similar to you when
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showing me who causes and who is to blame for what happens in the 
stories about him. Please remember that someone causes something 
when they are the person that makes the thing happen. When someone 
is to blame, they might deserve to be punished for what happens.
read three stories 
You know, Jane, the main person in the next three stories, 
is very, very different from the way you described yourself. She is 
not like you at all. I'd like you to remember that when showing me 
who causes and who is to blame for what happens in the stories about 
her.
read three stories— then tape 
The next three stories are about Jane. When you show me 
who causes and who is to blame for what happens, please remember that 
she is very different from you.
read three stories 
The next stories are about William. When you show me who 
causes and who is to blame for what happens, please remember that he 
is very similar to you.
Instructions for male,subjects: Different-similar
You know, Jane, the main person in the next three stories, 
is very, very different from the way you described yourself. She is 
not like you at all. I ’d like you to remember that when showing me 
who causes and who is to blame for what happens in the stories about 
her. Please remember that someone causes something when they are
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the person that makes the thing happen. When someone is to blame, 
they might deserve to be punished for what happens.
read three stories 
You know, William, the main person in the next three stories,
is very similar to you. He is also  ________, '  , and  .
I want you to remember that he is very similar to you when showing 
me who causes and who is to blame for what happens in the stories 
about him.
read three stories— then tape 
The next stories are about William. When you show me who 
causes and who is to blame for what happens, please remember that he 
is very similar to you.
read three s tories 
The next three stories are about Jane. Please remember that 
she is very different from you when showing me who causes and who is 
to blame for what happens.
References
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